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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A. WILcox.

State v. Holloway, New Mex., 146 Pac. 1066.

Change of

venue. Defendant was indicted for embezzlement. Upon motion of the state
for a change of venue, the court transferred the trial to another county. Defendant
was convicted and appealed. One ground of appeal was that the statute authorizing
a change of venue on the application of the state violated the following provision
of the state constitution: "In all criminal prosections the accused shall have the
right * * * to a separate public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." Held, that in
view of the law on this subject prior to the adoption of the constitution, the right
to be tried in the county in which the crime was committed is subject to the condition
that an impartial jury can be obtained in that county. If an impartial jury can'be
obtained the state cannot have the venue changed without the consent of fhe accused.
But if a jury cannot be obtained in the county that is not partial to the accused,
the constitution does not give the accused the right to be tried by such partial jury
but the state may have the venue changed without his consent.
Hyde v. Slate, Tenn., 174 S. W. 1127. Sale of Opium. A statute regulating the
sale of opium and its compounds and derivatives allowed registered physicians to
dispense or distribute such drugs, but only in the course of their professional practice
to patients whom they were personally attending. On appeal from a conviction
for violation of the statute, it was contended that the statute was in conflict with
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, in that it arbitrarily curtailed the right of a physician to practice by prescribing according to methods
formerly obtaining. This it was contended deprived him of liberty of property
without due process of law. Held, that in the exercise of the police power the legislature may regulate the sale and distribution of any drug of a poisonous nature, the
use of which tends to debauch the public by forming a habit that undermines the
physical, mental, and moral constitution of the users. The requirement that the
physician shall personally attend the patient is reasonable since only by personal
observation and diagnosis can he be sure that the drug is needed.

Collins v. Johnston, Warden. 35 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 649.

Equal protection of the

laws. The equal protection of the laws is not denied to a person sentenced to

14 years imprisonment for the crime of perjury, under the authority of Cal. Pen.
Code, Sec. 126, which makes perjury punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for not less than one nor more than 14 years, altho five years imprisonment
may be the average maximum penalty for other felonies denounced by Cal. laws,
some of which may beof greater gravity and of more injurious consequences'than
-j
perjury-, -
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Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 108 N. E. 893, Mass. Chiropractice.
Laws, c. 76, sec. 8, providing that one not lawfully authorized to practice medicine
and registered thereto, who holds himself out as a practicioner of medicine or
practices or attempts to practice medicine in any of its branches, construed as
including chiropractice, is constitutional, as a police enactment in the interest of
public health and safety, not impairing the liberty of contract.
Nor is such statute,' rendered unconstitutional as an unreasonable classification,
denying the equal protection of the laws by the fact' that sec. 9 exempts certain
classes, such as osteopaths and pharmacists, and those practicing Christian Science,
mind cure, massage, etc.
Fox v. State of Washington, 35 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 383. Indefiniteness of criminal
statute.
A statute, which like Rem. & Bal. Code, sec. 2564, makes criminal the editing
of printed matter tending to encourage and advocate disrespect for law, cannot be
said to violate U. S. Const., 14th Amend., as being an unjustifiable restriction of
liberty, and too indefinite for a criminal statute, where the highest state court,
by implication at least, reads the statute as confined to encouraging an actual breach
of the law, and in the case at bar has merely construed it as embiacing an article
encouraging and inciting a persistance in what would be a breach of the state laws
against indecent exposure.
COLLEGES AND UNIv ERSITIES.

Commonwealth v. New England College of Chiropractice,Inc. Mass., 108 N . E. 895.
Rev. Laws c. 208, sec. 75, provides that whoever, without the authority of a special
act granting the power to give degrees, confers or grants degrees as a school, college,
or as a private individual, shall be punished. A college of chiropractice, not authorized by law to confer degrees, issued a diploma signed by its officers and faculty,
all of whom wrote after their names "D. C.," standing for "Doctor of Chiropractice,"
stating that a student having completed the prescribed courses of study, and met
all the requirements for graduation, had been declared a doctor of chiropractic.
Held, that the diploma was a degree, which as used in the statute, is any academic
rank recognized by colleges and unviersities having a reputable character as institutions of learning or any form of expression indicative of academic rank, so as
to convey to the ordinary mind the idea of some collegiate, unviersity or scholastic
distinction: that the word "Doctor" as a perfix to a person's name, signifies an
academic distinction founded upon having received a degree, and, as commonly
used, indicates skill in the general subject of medicine: that the word "chiropractic"
has such a meaning that one practicing it may be found to be-practicing medicine;
and hence that defendant college was subject to the penalty.
BURGLARY.

People v. Toland, 151 N. Y., Supp. 482. "Breaking out" of a building under
statute.
Breaking out of a building was not burglary at common law, and where defendant entered a barn through an open outer door and stole a heifer, and an accomplice closed the door through which they had entered while the heifer was being
caught and killed, the opening of such door on leaving by the defendant or his
accomplice would not constitute such a breaking out as is neccessary to constitute
burglary under Penal Law, sec. 404, subd. 2. Kellogg and Woodward, J. J. dissenting.
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EVIDENCE.

State v. Ruttberg, N. J., 93 Atl. 97.

Sexual incapacity.

In a prosecution for fornication, the testimony of defendant's wife that, for
several years prior to the alleged offense, he was physically incapable of sexual
intercourse, was improperly excluded on an objection that sexual incapacity could
be shown only by the testimon ' of a duly qualified physician.
FOOD AND DRUGS ACT.

U. S. v. American Laboratories,222 Fed., 104. Effect of the Sherley Amendment.
The Sherley amendment (Act of August 23, 1912) to the Food and Drugs Act,
punishing the making of false and fraudulent statements of the curative properties
of medicines is within the power of Congress to enact, and while one may not be
convicted thereunder merely because he advocates a theory of medicine which at
the time has not received the sanction of the medical profession, yet one guilty of
fraud may not escape conviction merely because some one may honestly believe in
the theory he fraudulently sets forth, and the essential difference is one of fact for
the jury.
FORMER JEOPARDY.
Hall v. State, Ala. App., 67 So. 739. Refusal to receive verdict. On a trial for
homicide, the jury returned a verdict of guilt of manslaughter in the second degree
and fixed the punishment at a fine of $25.00 and thirty days in prison at hard labor.
The court refused to receive the verdict, instructed the jury that if they found the
defendant guilty they could not find him guilty of less than manslaughter in the
first degree; that they had not been instructed upon the offense of manslaughter in
the second degree and that they should retire and further consider their verdict.
The court gave them forms of verdicts, including the verdict of not guilty. The
jury retired, and later returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first
degree, fixing tre punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for one year
and one day. Judgment was entered upon the verdict and defendant appealed.
There was no evidence that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree. Held, that the verdict was an acquittal of the higher degrees of homicide.
The court had no more legal power to refuse to receive that verdict than he would
have had to receive a verdict of not guilty. Consequently the second verdict and
the judgment upon it were invalid. The conviction was reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial with the ruling that if the defendant should plead former
jeopardy he could not be convicted of any higher offense than manslaughter in the
second degree. The court suggested that if the trial judge had originally charged
the jury that they could not find defendant guilty of a less offence than manslaughter
in the first degree he might have power to refuse to receive a verdict rendered in
positive violation of this instruction, but left the question open for decision when
it should arise.
McCaskey v. State, Tex. Crim. App., 174 S. W. 338. Variance. Defendant
was tried on an indictment charging that he had robbed one Burton of "one ten
cent piece commonly known as one dime." The evidence showed that he robbed
Burton of two five cent pieces. The state dismissed that case because of the variance
between the charge and the proof. Defendant was then indicted for robbing Burton
of "two five cent pieces of money commonly known as nickels, "and pleaded former
jeopardy. He was convicted and appealed. Held, that an acquittal upon the
first charge could not and did not put him in jeopardy for the offence charged in
the second indictment. Hence the trial court did not err in striking out the plea
of former jeopardy. The conviction was affirmed.
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GRAND JURY.

, U. S. v. Philadelphia& R. Ry. Co., 221 Fed., 683. Presence of special attroney
as stenographer.
Act June 30, 1906, providing that any attorney or counselor, specially appointed
by the Attorney General, may conduct grand jury proceedings, does not authorize
the appointment of an attorney, who was not intended to conduct the proceedings,
but whose sole duty was to report stenographically the testimony of witnesses before
the grand jury, and the presence of such person in the grand jury room during the
taking of testimony is ground for quashing the indictment.
Hollars v. State, Md., 93 Ati., 970. Error in name. Age of juror.
A clerical error in the name of a grand juror, as drawn from the box, does not
invalidate an indictment returned by the jury, where the juror who served was the
one intended, and there was no showing that the defendant was in any way prejudiced
by the error.
The requirement of the Code Pub. Civ. Laws, art. 51, sec. 1, that no person
under 25 shall be selected as a grand juror is directory, and not mandatory, since
there is no procedure provided by which the clerk can ascertain the ages of those
placed on the jury lists, and where the name of a grand juror under 25 was placed
on such list because of an honest mistake of the clerk, an indictment found by the
grand jury is not thereby rendered invalid.
HABEAS CORPUS.

Frank v. Mangum, Sheriff of Fulton Co., Georgia, 35 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 582.
Federal interference with state administration of criminal law. Habeas
Corpus will not issue out of the Federal Courts in behalf of a person in custody
under a conviction of crime in a state court who asserts in his petition for the writ
the existence at the trial of disorder, hostile manifestations and uproar, amounting
to mob domination of court and jury, and hence a denial of the due process of law
guaranteed by U. S. Const. 14th Amend., where such assertions are but repitions
of allegations which the accused had a right to submit and did submit first to the
trial court on motion for a new trial, and afterwards to the highest state court
as a ground for avoiding the consequences of the trial, and where both courts having
considered such allegations successively at times and places under circumstances
wholly apart from the atmosphere of the trial and free from any suggestion of mob
domination and the like, and having examined the facts, not only upon the affidavits
and exhibits submitted in behalf of the prisoner, which are embodied in his petition
for habeas corpus, but also upon rebutting affidavits submitted by the state,
which for reasons not explained he has not included in such petition, found the allegations to be groundless except in a few particulars as to which the courts ruled
they were irregularities not harmful to the defendant, and therefore insufficient
in law to'avoid the verdict. Hughes & Holmes, J. J., dissenting.
(NOTE.-Judgment of death has since been communted to life imprisonment
by the retiring governor, John M. Slaton.)
ILLEGAL SEARCH.

Holloway v. State, Ga. App., 84 S.E. 590. Evidence thereby obtained is inadmissable. Where the only-evidence that the defendant was carrying a concealed
weapon was obtained through an unlawful assault made by an officer upon the
defendant, in violation of the defendant's right of personal privacy, it was held
that the trial court should have granted a new trial, since the constitution protects
the defendant from incriminating evidence obtained by an illegal seizure and search
of his person.
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INDETERMINATE SENTENCE.

Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 174 S. W. 476. Interval of one day. The
jury found the defendant guilty of grand larceny and fixed his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than one year and
one day. One ground of appeal was that this verdict did not provide indeterminate
punishment. Held, that as a maximum and a minimum limit was fixed the verdict
and judgment were indeterminate within the meaning of the statute.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

Ware v. State, Ala., 67 So. 763.

Variance. An indictment for robbery described

various articles that were stolen, including "$5.00 lawful money of the United

States of America, a particular description of which $5.00 is to the jury unknown."
At the trial, the person who had been robbed described the other articles as they were
described in the indictment, but said that the $5.00 was a five dollar bill and that
he had so described it before the grand jury. The defendant was convicted, and one
ground upon which he appealed was that there was a fatal variance between the
description of the stolen property in the indictment and the proof at the trial,
because the description of the $5.00 was known to the grand jury. Held, that as a
general rule a conviction cannot be sustained on an indictment which avers that
a fact is unknown to the grand jury, if it appears upon the trial that the fact was
known to them. But this rule is confined to material facts. The indictment
sufficiently identified the offence by a definite description of the other property
taken, and a general description of the $5.00 as "lawfull money of the United States
of America." The allegation that a further description of the $5.00 was unknown to
the grand jury may be rejected as surplus age. If the indictment had charged the
taking of only the $5.00, there would be merit in the defendants contention. But
it charges the taking of other articles each of which is sufficiently described in the
indictment. Hence the conviction was affirmed.
INSANITY.

Walters v. State, 108 N. E., 583 Ind. Burden of proof.
An instruction that the burden of proving insanity rests on accused, but that,
while the burden rests on him to prove insanity, yet he need not prove it beyond
a reasonable doubt, or even by the burden of the evidence, but it is sufficient if accused raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to whether at the time
of the commission of the crime he was of sound mind, and if the jury entertain a
reasonable doubt on the subject he should be acquitted, is objectionable as misleading.
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE.

People v. Byzon, Illinois, 108 N. E. 685. Vacation of judgment on plea of guilty.
Where accused 18 years old and unacquainted with methods of criminal procedure, pleaded guilty in reliance of representations by the officer arresting him that
he would be released under the probation law, on pleading guilty, the court should
vacate the judgment entered on the plea and permit withdrawal thereof, though
the court offered to appoint counsel for him and advised him of the effect of a plea
of guilty.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
SOLICITATION BY POLICE OFFICER.

Hyde v. State, Tenn., 174 S.W. 1127. For purpose of detection. A statute
prohibits the sale, barter, distribution or gift of opium or any compound derivative
or preparation therefrom; except (a) The dispensation or distribution of such drugs
to any patient by any registered physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon in the
course of his professional practice only when personally attending such patient,
(b) The sale, dispensation or distribution of such drugs by registered pharmacists
under a written prescription issued, dated and signed by a registered physician,
dentist, orveterinary surgeon. A detective went to the defendant's office and asked
for a prescription for morphine for one Louise Walker whose address he gave.
No such person existed and there was no such street address as that given. Defendant issued the Prescription and was paid for it. The detective took it to a pharmacy
where it was filled. The detective paid for the morphine. The defendant was then
charged with a violation of the statute and convicted. An appeal was taken, one
ground being that the prescription was issued at the solicitation of an agent of the
state government for the purpose of a criminal prosecution, and that the drug was
not to be used. Held, that by the overwhelming weight of authority such acts
of government agents do not detract from the guilt of the person who has violated
the statute. Prosecutions for larceny, where the owner of the stolen goods has
consented to their being taken, so that no trespass was committed, were distinguished.
It was immaterial that Louise Walker was a ficticious person. There was a sale
by the druggist to the detective, based upon the prescription. A the sale was
induced by the prescription "proceeding from one on whose discretion as trusted
agent of society the legislature had made the dispensation of the drug to depend,"
the physician is a principle in the illegal sale. The fact that the alleged patient
did not exist shows at once the recklessness of the accused and a substantial reason
for the requirement that a prescription should be given only to a patient actually
attended. Otherwise habitual users could obtain the drugs by getting prescriptions
made out to ficticious persons.
Legislation Ex Post Facto In Changing the Punishment for Crime. The United States Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of a statute
of South Carolina changing the punishment of murder from hanging to electrocution, so far as regards such an offense committed prior to the statute is
concerned, and upholds same as not being an ex post facto law. Maloy v. South
Carolina, 35 Sup. Ct. 507.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in speaking for the court, refers to Calder v.Bull,
3 Dall. 386, 390, as to the constitutional sense of ex post facto law, wherein it is
said that: "Every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed" is an ex post facto
law.
The contention was made that: "Any statute enacted subsequent to the
commission of a crime which undertakes to change the punishment therefor is
ex post facto and unconstitutional unless it distinctly modifies the severity of the
former penalty." If we substitute for the word "modifies," the word, mitigates
or lessens, the contention would be more sharply expressed.
But in this inquiry we should remember that the constitutional expression,
"ex post facto law" is a limitation on state power, and it not being imposed the
state would be free even to make more severe the punishment that has been
affixed to the punishment of a prior crime. State constitutions generally contain the same prohibition on legislative power. The same observation is per-
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tinent as to them. Its presence, however, in one constitution or the other implies the necessity of putting a curb on legislative power. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the words of limitation must be taken according to the
sense in which they are used.
Calder v. Bull, supra, was decided in the very early history of our country
and similar provisions in state constitutions ought to be taken in the same sense
in which it was construed, unless we may suppose that a right amply protected
by the federal Constitution and from abundance of caution carried into state
constitutions, was declared in a different sense in the latter. There is a well
recognized rule that when a statute of one state is carried into the laws of another state, it goes there with prior construction. Why is not the same rule
applicable to constitutional provisions?
Taking it, then, that we are seeking to ascertain whether a law is ex post
facto, we must inquire, as a fact, whether, as in the case before the court, it
"inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed."
We believe it was urged by Patrick that an unapplied-for commutation from
execution to life imprisonment was a violation of his constitutional right, and it
may be conceivable that one might prefer to be executed than doomed to suffer
life imprisonment. But his claim was overruled, and rightly, too, we think, because the mere preference of a convict is no criterion by which to judge the
constitutionality of a law. In well understood acceptance the death penalty is
regarded as the supreme punishment of American law. Anarchists may well be
thought less deterred by the death penalty for their acts than by solitary imprisonment for the remainder of their life. But the law would regard the latter
punishment as a mitigation of the former.
And so if the means or method of inflicting death-a sudden snuffing out of
the vital spark instead of slow 'strangulation to the end-is changed, some convicts might prefer the strangulation. But the law may declare that the former
is a mitigation in severity of the latt&, though instances have occurred where
death by strangulation did not supervene, though officially declared to have so
done.
Refinement such as plaintiff in error invoked have not so great place in
discussing the meaning of a limitation on power as it might have in considering
the extent of a granted power, which in itself is a limitation on right.
This limitation on the right of a state is construed by our supreme court as
it generally construes other similar restrictions in the federal Constitution, that
is to say, the words of the Constitution are taken as controlling actual, practical considerations and not according to metaphysical claims hindering their
application. By this kind of construction only may our dual system of government preserve to the general government and to the states their rightful control, whether in public functions or the regulation of private right. The contention of plaintiff in error was disallowed.-From Central Law Journal, May
21, 1915.
Evidence As To Trailing By Dogs. - It is a matter of common
knowledge that certain breeds of dogs possess the peculiar faculty of trailing by
scent. Proof of such trailing is admitted by the courts only upon the most satisfactory evidence of scenting ability. Rules for laying proper foundation for
admission of evidence of trailing by dogs are stated in detail in Fite v. State,
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84 S. E. 485: "Evidence as to the conduct of dogs in following tracks should
not be admitted until after a preliminary investigation, in which it is established that one or more of the dogs in question were of a stock characterized by
acuteness of scent and power of discrimination, and had been trained or tested
in the exercise of these qualities in the tracking of human beings, and were in
the charge of one accustomed to use them. It must also appear that the dogs
so trained and tested were laid on a trail, whether visible or not concerning
which testimony has been admitted, and upon a track which, the circumstances
indicate to have been made by the accused. When these preliminary tests have
been made, the fact of tracking by a bloodhound may be permitted to go to the
jury as one of the circumstances which may tend to connect the defendant with
the crime with which he is charged. Should the preliminary investigation disclose either that the dog was not of proper stock or untrained, or not in the
charge of a person familiar with such dogs, or was not placed upon a trail connected at least by circumstances with the defendant, the trial court should exclude the entire testimony as to the conduct of the dogs. When such a foundation as that referred to above has been laid, and evidence showing the conduct
of the dogs has been received, the jury should be charged, in substance, that
before they can consider the conduct of the dogs they must find that the dogs
were accurate, certain, and reliable in following the trail of human footsteps,
and that if they find this, then the evidence of the conduct of the dogs and its
result may be considered, together with all the other evidence in the case, as a
circumstance in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.-So. Rep.
Vol. 67, No. 11.

